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This paper uses the financial statements of special purpose entities (SPEs) for explaining the 
origin and destination of dividend, interest, and royalty flows passing the Netherlands. We 
find that Bermuda is the most important destination for royalty flows. These flows come 
from Ireland, Singapore and the United States. For dividend and interest payments the 
geographical pattern is more widespread. We find a substantial tax reduction for royalties by 
using Dutch SPEs compared to a direct flow between the origin and destination country. 
However, we cannot find such tax savings for dividends and interest with an approximation 
based on statutory tax rates. When controlling for country characteristics in our regression 
analysis we do find that tax differentials partially explain the geographical patterns of 
income flows diverted through the Netherlands. This is the case for the likelihood that a 
route is used, as well as for the size of the flows. This paper is one of the first using bilateral 
income flows as dependent variables instead of bilateral FDI stocks or flows.  
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1 Introduction 
Tax avoidance and evasion are high on the policy agenda, also in the Netherlands. The Dutch 
rank high on international FDI (foreign direct investment) positions; for inward and outward 
positions they are in the top 3, together with the United States and Luxembourg, holding 
about 15% of the global FDI stock. The FDI positions amount to five times GDP and about 80 
percent of these FDI positions is on the balance sheets of Special Purpose Entities (SPEs) or 
shell companies. Recently, the Netherlands is classified as a top conduit country (European 
Commission, 2017). The Dutch SPEs are crucial for the investment and income flows passing 
through the Netherlands. 
 
Although there are various papers in the literature identifying conduit countries1 the 
underlying structures at the micro level are less investigated. This is also the case for the vast 
literature on international tax avoidance. A large part of the estimates on international tax 
avoidance is derived from macro aggregates, e.g. Torslov et al. (2018). What is missing are 
analyses at the firm level, in particular using the primary income flows. Except for studies 
with the Bundesbanks’ MiDi database on German multinationals2, there is hardly empirical 
material in this respect. This paper intends to fill this gap. We have the opportunity to use 
firm level data from SPEs, covering the incoming and outgoing income flows and debt and 
equity positions. By using these data we try to find out whether the conduit role of the 
Netherlands is indeed motivated by the international tax system. And if so, what are the tax 
planning gains of using Dutch SPEs? 
 
First, the paper describes the geographical pattern of incoming and outgoing income flows of 
Dutch SPEs. For all country pairs, we construct bilateral flows of dividends, interest and 
royalties that are diverted via the Netherlands, by linking incoming and outgoing flows 
within SPEs that belong to the same owner. Second, these flows are combined with bilateral 
tax parameters to estimate the importance of fiscal motives for these flows. This also allows 
us to estimate the tax planning gains involved with the diversion of income flows through the 
Netherlands. Third, we examine to what extent tax parameters are indeed determinants for 
both the likelihood that a route is used and for the size of the flow.  
 
We have data for about the ten percent largest SPEs in the Netherlands between 2004 and 
2016, representing two thirds to 80 percent of all foreign assets of Dutch SPEs in these years. 
SPEs are required to report monthly their transactions and balance sheet items by 
geographic relation to the Dutch central bank (DNB). It contains dividend, royalty and 
interest flows, both incoming to and outgoing from the Netherlands, for the immediate 
countries of origin and destination.  
 
Publicly available macro data show a large increase in FDI, consisting of foreign equity and 
loans, in these years, from 1,500 to 4,200 billion euro. In our sample the increase is 
somewhat lower but still impressive; from 1,200 billion euro in 2004 to 2,900 billion euro in 
 
1 Garcia -Bernardo et al. (2017), Hong (2018), Mintz (2004), Van ‘t Riet and Lejour (2018), Weyzig (2013), among others.  
2 Mintz and Weichenrieder (2010). 
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2016. The most important flows are dividends. The size of outgoing dividend is 51 billion 
euro and of incoming dividend is 77 billion euro on average in 2014-2016. A part of the 
incoming dividend is used for new loans and foreign investments. The incoming and 
outgoing royalty flows are 26 and 28 billion euro on average in 2014-2016. 
 
We find that almost all royalties come from Ireland, Singapore and the United States and go 
to Bermuda and the United States. For interest and dividend the geographical distribution is 
somewhat broader, although about 60 percent of dividends and about 45% of interest goes 
to multinationals in the US, UK, Switzerland and Luxembourg. Besides these countries, 
dividend also flows to other European countries and to some tax havens. The source of 
dividend and interest is really multilateral: from the US, tax havens and European conduit 
countries. It suggests that the Netherlands is but one link in chains of complex financial 
flows. 
  
We develop a measure for tax planning gain and apply this to the relevant income flows to 
and from the SPEs. We distinguish between a direct and an indirect tax gain. The direct 
planning gain occurs when interest and royalty flows, which are tax deductible in the 
country of origin, are taxed at a lower rate in the destination country. The indirect gain may 
arise in a conduit situation; we compare the tax burden on direct routes, without passing the 
Netherlands, and the tax burden on indirect routes via the Netherlands, see also Hong (2018) 
and van ‘t Riet and Lejour (2018). We label this tax differential as the treaty shopping gain. 
 
For measuring the direct planning gain and the treaty shopping gain, we use the relevant tax 
variables, such as withholding taxes, corporate tax rates, double tax relief methods and tax 
treaties. We have gathered data for more than 100 countries, including tax havens, for three 
reference years, 2009, 2013, and 2017. Our main source for these data is the International 
Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (IBFD). We collect the tax parameters for the three different 
income flows: dividend, royalties and interest. On average, we observe little variation over 
time in the level of the tax rates and do not find strong evidence of a tax race to the bottom. 
 
With the tax parameters we construct the two tax rate differentials, the direct tax planning 
gain and the treaty shopping gain, and combine these with the bilateral flows to approximate 
the tax planning gain. A rough measure of the total annual gain realized on royalties through 
Dutch SPEs is 1.2 billion euro, for the other income flows the gains are negligible or non-
existent. Given incoming and outgoing flows of more than 100 billion euro per year this tax 
planning gain could be interpreted as modest. The approximation must be seen as a lower 
bound, i.e. underestimating the full size of the tax planning gain, or tax avoidance. One reason 
is that the estimate does not capture the tax planning gains that can be made in other 
countries, i.e. when the immediate destination of the flow is a conduit jurisdiction in a longer 
chain of countries. We remark that we cannot determine whether the two countries of a flow 
are the ultimate country of origin or destination.  
 
Finally, with an econometric analysis we estimate the determinants for guiding income flows 
via the Netherlands. We explain the likelihood that a route is used, the extensive margin, and 
the size of the flow, the intensive margin. The determinants of the extensive margin are 
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estimated using a probit model and for the intensive margin we use OLS and a Poisson 
Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) method. The main independent variable is the treaty 
shopping gain, i.e. the tax rate differential between the direct route (without the 
Netherlands) and the indirect route (using Dutch SPEs). For dividend, interest and royalty 
flows we find that a larger treaty shopping gain increases the probability that the flow is 
diverted via a Dutch SPE. If the tax differential is 10% points higher (making the indirect 
route more attractive), the marginal probability increases by 1.6% points for dividends, 
1.6% points for interest and 3.4% points for royalties. These effects are statistically 
significant. A higher treaty shopping gains (TSG) also increases the size of the income flow 
via the Netherlands. A 10% point higher TSG on average increases the flow of dividends by 
3%, the flow of interest by 31% and the flow of royalties by nearly 76%.  
 
The paper contributes in various ways to the literature. Foremost it analyses bilateral flows 
of dividends, royalties and interest, derived from a dataset on Dutch SPEs. Except for an 
earlier paper of Weyzig (2013), mainly analyzing FDI stock data, these data have never been 
exploited. The access to this unique data set is one of the privileges of this paper. It permits 
to examine the direct impact of taxation on the existence and size of these bilateral flows, 
instead of measuring an indirect impact on the FDI positions. Second, this paper develops 
measures for the direct tax planning gain and the treaty shopping gain, exploiting tax 
parameters and the bilateral allocation of the different income flows. Third, we explain the 
variation in these income flows in a cross-sectional econometric analysis. Apart from a paper 
of Dudar et al. (2015) on royalty flows we are not aware of other papers explaining bilateral 
flows on dividend, interest or royalties. Overesch and Wamser (2014) explain bilateral 
internal debt financing by the tax differential between the borrowing and lending country. 
They find a strong effect. However, they use a stock variable debt instead of the interest flow 
which is taxed.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the financial statement data of the Dutch 
SPEs from DNB. The construction of the bilateral income flows is presented here as well. 
Next, section 3 is a methodological section on the approximation of the tax planning gain. 
Section 4 presents the tax parameters and combines these with the constructed bilateral 
income flows to estimate the tax planning gains. Section 5 discusses the results of the 
econometric analysis. Section 6 concludes. 
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2 Dutch Special Purpose Entities 
Financial data on Special Purpose Entities (SPEs) are provided by the Dutch Central Bank 
(DNB). SPEs are entities that are directly or indirectly controlled by foreign owners and have 
their assets and liabilities primarily in other countries. DNB collects data on all SPEs, but the 
surveys are more detailed for an unbalanced sample of SPEs. We only use data from this 
sample, since these include financial data by country origin and destination. We use data for 
the period 2004 to 2016.  
 
SPEs form a cluster if they have the same ultimate controlling owner. Table 2.1 shows the 
number of SPEs and the number of clusters in each year of our sample. The number of 
observations refers to combinations of SPEs and countries.3 The table reveals that the 
average number of SPEs per cluster increases from approximately 2 to 4 with a break 
between 2012 and 2013. This is due to the revision of the sampling method by DNB. The 
number of observations per SPE is more or less steady at about 9 observations per SPE, 
implicating that the SPE has financial relations with holdings in 9 countries (including the 
Netherlands). This average hides an enormous heterogeneity: from 2 to about 100 country-
observations per SPE per year. Since the income flows can be quite erratic over time, we 
mainly present three-year averages for the periods 2005-2007, 2008-2010, 2011-2013 and 
2014-2016. The number of unique SPEs, clusters and observations in such a period is much 
smaller than the sum of the three years, since there is a large overlap in SPEs and countries 
over the years.  
 
Table 2.1 Sample of Special Purpose Entities 
Year SPEs Clusters Observations 
    
2004 967 420 8532 
    
2005 978 473 9126 
2006 1029 510 9414 
2007 1155 593 10636 
2005-2007 1355 632 13617 
    
2008 1412 735 11831 
2009 1384 757 12969 
2010 1460 767 13204 
2008-2010 1819 927 17258 
    
2011 1409 739 13487 
2012 1650 745 14527 
2013 1344 320 11197 
2011-2013 2034 792 18114 
    
2014 1147 257 9772 
2015 1152 234 9846 
2016 1156 242 10367 
2014-2016 1503 319 13844 
 
 
3 For example, an SPE with assets in country A, B, C and liabilities in country C and D, has four observations in our data. 
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Figure 2.1 shows the development over time of total foreign assets of SPEs in our sample. 
Assets in the Netherlands are excluded. In the rest of the paper we also exclude any assets, 
liabilities, or transactions with third parties in the Netherlands. Since our sample is not 
representative over time, it is not suitable for drawing conclusions on the development over 
time. As a reference, the figure also contains total foreign assets of the full population of SPEs 
in the Netherlands, as reported by DNB. The SPEs in our sample cover between 66% (2015) 
and 84% (2012) of the total foreign assets of the population. The stagnation of total foreign 
assets in our sample in the last years is caused by changes in the composition of the sample;  
the sampling method is revised in 2013.  
 
Figure 2.1 Total foreign assets of SPEs at end of year of sample and population 
 
2.1 Assets and liabilities, incoming and outgoing flows 
We distinguish three categories of assets (affiliates; bonds and other loans; other) and three 
categories of liabilities (major shareholder equity; other loans; other). Appendix A shows a 
list of items contained in each category. We separate listed bonds from other liabilities, since 
we expect that tax motives are less relevant for issuing bonds than for borrowing from 
affiliates. On the asset side, bonds are combined with other loans, which is already the case in 
the source data.4  
 
Table 2.2 shows the sum of the foreign assets and liabilities mentioned above over all SPEs in 
our sample, averaged for the periods 2005-2007, 2008-2010, 2011-2013 and 2014-2016. 
These data are based on assets and liabilities in countries other than the Netherlands, which 
explains why total assets are not equal to total liabilities. SPEs invest mainly in equity of 
affiliated firms (62% in 2014-2016) and in debt (34% in 2014-2016). In this period they 
were financed by major shareholder equity (58%) and direct debt (24%). Between the first 
 






































and the last period in our sample, affiliated equity has become more important: its share 
increased from 55% to 62% (assets) and from 49% to 58% (liabilities).  
 









     
Assets     
Affiliates 911 1323 1724 1702 
Debt (including bonds) 692 873 963 942 
Other assets 50 80 86 97 
Total 1653 2276 2773 2741 
     
Liabilities     
Equity by major shareholders 827 1256 1666 1621 
Debt 479 631 660 661 
Other liabilities 377 449 446 503 
Total 1683 2336 2772 2785 
 
Table 2.3 shows the total incoming and outgoing flows to and from Dutch SPEs in our 
sample. Again this only reflects incoming and outgoing flows from and to other countries 
than the Netherlands. In line with total assets and liabilities, incoming and outgoing flows 
increased strongly between 2005-2007 and 2014-2016. Royalty flows were relatively small 
in 2005-2007, but increased substantially over time and incoming and outgoing royalty 
flows are even larger than interest flows in 2014-2016. However, only a small number of 
SPEs has incoming or outgoing royalties on their balance sheets, suggesting relatively large 
royalty flows by SPE compared to dividend and interest flows. Note that changes over time 
can reflect changes in the composition of the sample. This explains, for example, the big 
changes in the categories other income and other costs. 
 









     
Incoming     
Dividend from affiliates 57 75 92 77 
Interest from other loans 23 30 27 23 
Royalties 5.8 12 20 26 
Other income 8 26 40 2 
Total 94 143 178 128 
     
Outgoing     
Dividend to affiliates 40 56 61 51 
Interest on other loans 14 17 13 9 
Royalties 4 10 15 28 
Other costs 20 40 56 18 
Total 79 123 145 106 
 
In the remainder of the paper we focus on the spread of the incoming and outgoing flows. 
The dataset includes the country of origin and destination for assets, liabilities, incoming and 
outgoing flows. We show the share of incoming (Table 2.4) and outgoing flows (Table 2.5) of 
the total flow of the same category for the countries with the largest flows in 2014-2016. For 
dividends the incoming flows are less concentrated than for interest for example. Incoming 
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royalty flows are heavily concentrated. Most of them come from Ireland and the top 3 nearly 
covers 90 percent of the flows. Quite often the United States is the origin of a flow what can 
be explained by its economic size, but in many cases the size of the flows is hardly related to 
the economic size of the country of origin. Examples are Ireland, Luxembourg, Singapore, 
and Switzerland. The United States is also an important destination country, but we also find 
tax havens such as Bermuda and Cayman Islands in the top 3 and conduit countries such as 
Ireland, Luxembourg, Singapore, and Switzerland. Countries can be both relevant origin and 
destination countries. 
 







Country Share Country Share Country Share 
Singapore 11% Germany 23% Ireland 59% 
Brazil 11% Ireland 17% Singapore 19% 
United States 10% Spain 10% United States 9% 
Luxembourg 9% United States 8%   
Switzerland 7% United Kingdom 7%   
 







Country Share Country Share Country Share 
United States 23% United States 18% Bermuda 64% 
United Kingdom 14% United Kingdom 13% United States 23% 
Switzerland 13% Cayman Islands 12%   
Luxembourg 11% Luxembourg 8%   
Germany 7% Ireland 8%   
* Not reported due to non-disclosure rules. For outgoing royalties we show the largest flows for a different period (2008-2010). 
 
We only observe the flows to the first country of destination and do not know what happens 
after.5 However, it is most likely that the country of destination for outgoing flows is not 
always the final destination. An indication for this is the country of the ultimate beneficial 
owner (UBO). We have the country of the UBO for a subsample of SPEs, covering over 85% of 
outgoing dividend, interest and royalties. In Table 2.6 we compare the shares of outgoing 
flows with the shares of the ultimate beneficial owners. The table lists five countries that 
receive the largest dividend and interest flows and the three countries that receive the 
largest royalty flows.6 It shows that countries like Switzerland and Luxembourg (dividend), 
the Cayman Islands, Luxembourg and Ireland (interest) and Bermuda (royalties) receive 
relatively large flows while the ultimate beneficial owner resides in a different country. 
These countries are relatively often not the final destination of the income received from 
Dutch SPEs. The opposite is the case for the United States. A large part of the outgoing 
dividend (41%), interest (36%) and royalties (98%) are related to ultimate beneficial 
 
5 This is also the case for incoming flows. We do not know whether the active business income was generated in the 
immediate country of origin.  
6 The ranking and shares can deviate somewhat from Table 2.5, since Table 2.6 is based on the subsample of SPEs for 
which the country of the ultimate beneficial owner is known.  
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owners in the United States, but the direct flows from Dutch SPEs to the United States are 
only 26% for dividend, 18% for interest and 23% for royalties.7  
 
The fact that various countries of origin or destination are tax havens, or conduit countries, 
suggests that the cross-border flows pass various countries. This contradicts with Mintz and 
Weichenrieder (2012) concerning German multinationals in 2001. They examine ownership 
chains and find that only 1.2% of all chains passes three or more borders. In this respect, the 
Netherlands seem to have a different role than Germany. 
 
Table 2.6 Outgoing flows to countries and ultimate beneficial owners 
 Dividend (in %)  
2014-2016 
 Interest (in %) 
2014-2016 
 Royalties (in %) 
2008-2010 
Country Direct UBO Country Direct UBO Country Direct UBO 
United States 26 41 United States 18 36 Bermuda 65 * 
Switzerland 15 5 United Kingdom 13 9 United States 23 98 
United Kingdom 13 20 Cayman Islands 13 0    
Luxembourg 10 * Luxembourg 8 1    
Germany 8 9 Ireland 8 1    
* Not reported due to non-disclosure rules. For outgoing royalties we show the largest flows for a different period (2008-2010). 
2.2 Construction of bilateral flows 
For the analyses in the next sections of this paper we need bilateral primary income flows 
between two countries. We do not observe these bilateral flows for all SPEs directly in the 
data, and therefore, partially, have to construct these flows.  
 
In some cases this is straightforward. Consider a SPE that is owned by a single owner in 
country B and invests in affiliates in countries A1, A2 and A3. It receives dividends X1, X2 and 
X3 from its affiliates and pays out the sum of these dividends as dividend to its owner in 
country B. In this case we define the dividend flow from Ai to B as Xi. However, the type of the 
incoming flow is not necessarily the same as the type of the outgoing flow. If the SPE was 
fully financed by debt instead of equity, it would use its incoming dividend to pay interest to 
its lender in country B.  
 
In most cases the allocation is not as straightforward as in the examples above, due to three 
reasons. First, SPEs often receive payments from multiple countries and also make payments 
to multiple countries. In these cases, the SPE acts as a hub. This is illustrated by Figure 2.2, 
where C is the Dutch SPE, A1, … An are countries where flows originate from and B1, … Bm are 
 
7 The data allow us to consider more income routes between different countries with the Netherlands as intermediate than 
particular cases presented in the media. However the data do not allow for the analysis of multi-country income routes. 
Take the well-known double Irish –Dutch sandwich as many US MNEs have used. With these data we notice the income 
flow from the company in Ireland to the holding in Netherlands. These are often royalties because Ireland levies a 
withholding tax on royalties and the Netherlands not (until 2021). However, we do not see the royalty’s flows from other 
countries to Ireland. Probably these flows will also lead to a tax savings gain, which is also not included in our estimates in 
Section 4. We do see the royalties from the Netherlands to the Irish holding on Bermuda (originated from the holding in 
Ireland). So the can quantify the last two steps to the final destination (Irish – Dutch – Irish on Bermuda), but still do not 
know where the incomes are generated (see link). 
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countries of destination for these flows. For about 95% of the total incoming and outgoing 
flows, the cluster of SPEs has multiple countries of origin and destination.  
 
Figure 2.2 The SPE as a hub 
 
 
Second, there can be several types of incoming and/or outgoing flows. For example, this 
happens when an SPE is financed by equity as well as debt and pays out dividend and 
interest. In these cases we need to connect the incoming flows to both types of outgoing 
flows.  
 
A third complication is that total incoming flows are not always equal to total outgoing flows. 
This happens, for example, when incoming dividend is retained and distributed to the 
owners in later years. It is also possible that outgoing payments are smaller than incoming 
payments due to taxes in the source country.8  
 
We deal with the problems of multiple countries and/or multiple types of flows by assigning 
the flows proportionally. The problem of unequal incoming and outgoing payments is solved 
with by defining the total flow as the minimum of total incoming and total outgoing 









where Fio,xy is the calculated flow of type i from country x to country y as type o, It=i,x is the 
incoming flow of type i from country x, Ot=o,y is the outgoing flow of type o to country y, TI is 
the total incoming flow of the cluster from all countries and in all types and TO is the total 
outgoing flow of the cluster to all countries and in all types. Subscripts for time and clusters 
are omitted. The left part of the equation gives a fraction of the total flow of the cluster that 
we allocate to the flow between country x and y as type i to type o. This fraction is multiplied 
by the minimum of the total incoming flow and the total outgoing flow. 9 We only take into 
account positive incoming and outgoing flows and we ignore negative flows. After calculating 
the bilateral primary income flows, we determine the aggregates between two countries by 
summing over all clusters.  
 
 
8 SPEs are assumed to report gross payments before withholding taxes. When withholding taxes are paid in the source 
country, the actual income by the SPE is smaller than the reported income, which also means there is less available for 
outgoing payments.  
9 As a robustness check we also perform this allocation using the maximum instead of the minimum of the total incoming 






Table 2.7 shows the assigned primary income flows, by type averaged over 2014-2016. This 
table is based on the allocation of the minimum of total incoming and outgoing income per 
cluster, as explained above. Appendix B contains a similar table based on an allocation using 
the maximum. The values in the upper left box represent the sum of the flows between every 
pair of countries. In addition to flows between two foreign countries, the table reports a row 
and column labeled ‘NL/retained’. These contain a large part of total incoming and outgoing 
income. The first reason for this is that there are substantial flows between foreign countries 
and third parties in the Netherlands. Since we are only interested in flows between two 
foreign countries, we exclude these flows from the analysis. The second reason is that 
incoming and outgoing flows are not always equal for individual SPE-clusters. If incoming 
foreign payments are higher, some income is left within the SPE or paid as taxes. Outgoing 
payments can also be higher if SPEs make payments from previously retained income. These 
differences are allocated to and from retained income. For the full sample in 2014-2016, 
SPEs received annually 128.1 billion euro from and paid out 106.4 billion euros to foreign 
countries. The rows and columns add up to the totals reported in Table 2.3.10 
 
Table 2.7 Assigned primary income flows, by type in 2014-2016 (billion euros) 
          To: Dividend Interest Royalties Other To NL /  
retained 
Total 
From:       
Dividend 29.1 4.1 6.3 7.0 30.4 76.9 
Interest 5.4 3.1 0.9 7.3 6.4 23.1 
Royalties 1.7 0.2 19.8 0.2 4.0 25.9 
Other 0.7 0.1 0.2 0.9 0.4 2.3 
From NL / 
retained 











  128.1 
106.4 
 
In the remainder of the paper, we focus on the flows Fio,xy between two foreign countries (x ≠ 
NL and y ≠ NL), where the incoming type i is the same as the outgoing type o (i=o). As the 
diagonal of Table 2.7 shows, these form the bulk of international flows, representing 61% in 
the period 2014-2016.11 In particular, we focus on flows of dividend, interest, and royalties. 
These flows will be used to estimate the treaty shopping gain in section 4.2 and for the 
regression analysis in section 5. 
 
 
10 The totals in Table 2.3 are slightly lower, since it includes negative values, while Table 2.7 is based only on positive 
values. However, the difference is negligible and is not visible in the rounded values.  
11 A relatively large amount (6.6 billion euro) is transformed from incoming interest to outgoing payments on securities. In 
most cases, these outgoing payments on securities consist of interest paid on listed bonds. We separate these from 
interest on other loans, because we expect tax planning motives to be less relevant for payments on listed securities. 
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3 Approximating tax planning gain 
In recent years a number of studies have estimated the size of international tax avoidance 
and evasion. Some of them include international tax planning strategies of firms and wealthy 
individuals.12 Others focus mainly on the strategies of multinational firms. Gravelle (2013) 
estimates a loss of corporate tax revenues for the US of 0.6% of GDP. Crivelli et al. (2016) 
derive an estimated loss of about 1% of GDP for OECD countries and 1.3% for developing 
countries. They also include the effects of tax competition in their analysis. Beer et al. (2018) 
conclude that the tax revenue loss for the US is about 0.4%. For most developed countries 
the loss is much smaller and low tax jurisdictions obtain higher tax revenues. On average the 
tax revenue loss is only 0.1% of GDP.  
Concerning Dutch SPEs there are studies by Weyzig (2015) and of Kerste et al. (2013). They 
confirm the sizable diversion of FDI through the Netherlands, but they do not contain 
estimates on the size of tax avoidance. In this study we aim to estimate the size of tax 
avoidance through treaty shopping. However, instead of focussing on the tax revenues of the 
countries we focus on the tax planning gains of the firms. As we do not have actual tax 
revenues of SPEs at our disposal, we combine the observed income flows of the SPEs and a 
set of collected tax parameters.  
Tax planning gains do not always point to aggressive tax planning or evasion. Blouin (2014) 
concludes that there is no clear consensus at what point tax planning becomes aggressive. 
Quite often the savings from tax planning are not only legal, but these are also nonaggressive. 
Below we present our methodology. 
3.1 Direct tax planning gain 
A distinction can be made between avoiding or reducing double taxation and avoiding or 
reducing corporate taxation per se. This distinction broadly corresponds to the different 
mechanisms of international taxation of dividends on the one hand and taxation of interest 
and royalty payments on the other hand. 
 
Figure 3.1 Direct international income flow 
 
 
Let active corporate income be generated by an entity in source country A. This country has 
a nominal corporate income tax (CIT) rate of At . This entity may have borrowed from an 
entity in country B, or used intellectual property (IP) rights owned in B, which features a CIT 
rate of
Bt . In some period this will lead to an income flow x , interest or royalties, from 
country A to B, as illustrated in Figure 3.1. In most cases the interest or royalty payments 
 
12 Examples are Zucman (2013), Altstaeter et al. (2015), Torslov et al. (2018) and Henry (2012). 
A B
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made will be deductible from the taxable corporate income in country A. This implies a tax 
saving of 
At x . Source country A may levy a non-resident withholding tax ABw  on the income 
flow to country B. This gives a net flow of (1 )ABw x . Next, these flows are passive corporate 
income in country B, which will be subject to taxation in most cases: (1 )B ABt w x . The net 
tax savings are as follows: (1 )A AB B ABt x w x t w x   , or ( (1 ) )A B B ABt t t w x   .  
Residence country B may decide to credit withholding tax 
ABw x  against the taxes due in B, 
i.e. 
Bt x  as a form of double tax relief, discussed in more detail below. So, assuming that the 
CIT rate in the residence country is higher than the withholding tax of the source country the 
tax savings are ( )A Bt t x . 
When the net tax savings are positive we denote this as a direct tax planning gain. Without 
the withholding tax, there will be taxes saved, obviously, when the CIT rate in source country 
A exceeds the one in country B. Thus, the reference situation is where the loan is from, or the 
IP is located in, the very same country. We believe our definition is neutral and we refrain 
from using the term ‘avoidance’ in the definition as it may have negative connotations. Tax 
savings are equated with the tax planning gain. 
3.2 Treaty shopping gain 
Now consider the situation where the entity in A decides to distribute profits to owners 
located in residence country B. The dividend x  is after corporate taxation in A, of size
/ (1 )A At x t . Again, source country A may levy a non-resident withholding tax ABw . The 
subsequent dividend flow may be subject to taxation in residence country B too. This is 
double taxation.  
 
Figure 3.2 Indirect income  
 
In the case of direct dividend repatriation there seems to be no further scope for tax 
reduction. This all changes when a conduit entity in a third country C is used. The Dutch SPEs 
are the subject of this paper and the Netherlands exempts incoming dividends. Taxation on 
the indirect repatriation route equals, ignoring the CIT in A, and given dividend withholding 
taxes ACw  and CBw :   (1 ) (1 ) 1AC AC CB AC CB Bw w w w w t      . 
This taxation can be compared with that on the direct route, again without the CIT in A, 
(1 )AB AB Bw w t  . We interpret the difference between the tax costs on the direct route and 




where MNEs, rather than investing directly in a host country, funnel the investment through 
a third country to take advantage of treaty provisions not found between the host and the 
home country of the investment (Davies, 2004). 
There is only a gain if tax rate of the two withholding taxes wAC and wCB combined is lower 
than wAB. Such tax rates are often agreed upon in bilateral double tax treaties (DTT) to avoid 
double taxation of corporate income and to stimulate mutual FDI.  
International organizations warn against treaty shopping; it is one of the Action points of the 
G20/OECD BEPS-initiative (OECD, 2015) and IMF (2014) identifies it as a concern for 
developing countries because of the loss of their tax revenue. By definition, treaty shopping 
involves the indirect routing, or diversion, of investment.  
 
Double tax relief 
However, apart from DTTs, countries do also unilaterally apply various relief systems to 
avoid or reduce double taxation. The residence country may apply a dividend participation 
exemption, where incoming dividends are not taxed at all. Most often this is granted only 
when certain conditions are met, such as a threshold of 25% ownership of the foreign 
affiliate. Alternatively, the country may apply a credit system, where taxes paid in the source 
country are credited against the corporate taxes due in the residence country. Excess credit 
does not result in payment from the tax authority. Finally, there is deduction, which is when 
no relief is granted other than that there are no taxes due on taxes already paid.13  
The treaty shopping gain is determined by the country-specific CIT rate, the bilateral 
withholding taxes, and by the tax relief systems of the Netherlands and of the destination 
country. There are six different cases depending on the relief system of destination country B 
and the type of income flow. We first consider the taxes paid in each of the cases for direct 
flows from A to B in Table 3.1.  
 
Table 3.1 Taxation on the direct route A to B 
 Interest, royalties Dividend 
Exemption AB
w  (1 )A A ABt t w   
Credit 
max( , )AB Bw t  max( (1 ) , )A A AB Bt t w t   
Deduction 
(1 )AB AB Bw w t   (1 ) (1 )(1 )A A AB A AB Bt t w t w t      
 
Next we consider the tax burden on the indirect route. There will be no corporate income 
taxation in the conduit country C. Interest and royalties are in principle taxable foreign 
income, but we assume that it will immediately be deducted as it flows through to a next 
destination country B.14 There is no corporate income taxation for dividends, since the 
conduit country is the Netherlands, which applies the dividend participation exemption. The 
withholding tax rate CBw  for interest and royalties is zero in the Netherlands. Observe that 
 
13 For a discussion of double tax relief and the effective tax rates on dividend repatriation see also Barrios et al. (2012). 
14 In practice, an Advance Tax Ruling by the Dutch tax authority may result in some taxable income. 
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for interest and royalties the tax is identical in the credit and deduction cases since 0CBw 
and only taxation in the preceding country can be credited, as shown in Table 3.2. For a 
similar treatment of taxes on repatriated dividends, see Barrios et al. (2012). 
 
Table 3.2 Taxation on the indirect route from A via C to B  
 Interest, royalties Dividend 
Exemption AC
w  (1 ) (1 )(1 )A A AC A AC CBt t w t w w      
Credit 
(1 )AC AC Bw w t   (1 ) max[1 )(1 ) , ]A A AC A AC CB Bt t w t w w t      
Deduction 
(1 )AC AC Bw w t   (1 ) (1 )(1 ) (1 )(1 )(1 )A A AC A AC CB A AC CB Bt t w t w w t w w t          
 
Treaty shopping gain (TSG) is the difference between the taxation on the direct route and the 
indirect route, as specified in Table 3.1 and Table 3.2. The CIT in source country A drops out 
in the difference. For dividend this equals the total tax planning gain. In the case of interest 
and royalties this is different, as these deductible costs lead to a tax saving in country A at 
rate 
At .
15 The total tax planning gain (TPG) equals the sum of the direct tax gain (DTG) and 
the treaty shopping gain (TPG = DTG + TSG). For an overview of the tax variables see table 
3.3. The bilateral direct tax gain (DTG) and the bilateral treaty shopping gain (TSG) will be 
explanatory variables in the regression analyses.  
 
Table 3.3 List of tax variables 
Tax variable Description 
 
Equation Regression 
CITA , CITB Corporate income tax in host A, home B   
TAXAB Tax on the direct route A to B   
TAXACB Tax on the indirect route A to B over C = NLD   
DTG  Direct TAX planning Gain  = CITA - TAXAB yes 
TSG  Treaty ShoppingGain  = TAXAB - TAXACB yes 
TPB Total tax planning Gain  = DTG + TSG  
 
 
CFC – rules 
Some countries have implemented specific legislation to protect their tax bases, apart from 
general anti-abuse rules. By enacting so-called CFC (Controlled Foreign Company) rules the 
home country would deem foreign profits in LTJs as repatriated dividends and subsequently 
tax them. Even countries that usually exempt foreign dividends will, under specific control 
conditions of the CFC-rules, tax these profits. Voget (2011) demonstrates empirically that the 
introduction of CFC legislation has led to relocation of headquarters. Clifford (2018) does so 
for subsidiaries. Circumventing CFC-rules may also be possible by inserting an additional 
holding company in a jurisdiction which is not covered by the control conditions, possibly 
combined with a hybrid mismatch. CFC legislation may take many forms. We have 
implemented it as follows: for all countries with CFC-legislation, we set the tax relief method 
to ‘deduction’ for all jurisdictions on the Gravelle (2013) tax haven list.16  
 
15 We will assume full deductibility, thus ignoring thin capitalization rules. 
16 Obviously this is a crude proxy, but given the scope of our paper a reasonable assumption 
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Given the set of stylized definitions made above, an estimate of the tax planning gain can be 
computed. In principle this could be done at the level of individual SPEs as well as at the 
aggregate level.  
 
Underestimation of tax planning gain 
Above we have presented an operational definition of tax planning gain. There are three 
reasons why one will end up with a lower bound of this gain and why the actual gain may be 
higher. First, we use nominal CIT rates and do not include special circumstances, or regimes 
that may lower effective tax rates. Details of tax legislation that we have not been able to 
include are likely to imply lower taxes and, hence, higher gains. Second, and at least as 
important, there may be next jurisdictions involved, after B – the immediate destinations, 
with even lower tax rates, so that the tax gain based on the tax rate of jurisdiction B is an 
underestimation. Third, we take the primary income flows as given. The sizes of these flows 
are also part of the decisions of the MNEs and we cannot assess whether these represent 
‘correct’ values. For instance, the Arm’s length – principle may be hard to apply for royalties 
as often IP and its use are unique. Hence, we cannot address the transfer pricing channel of 
tax avoidance in this study. We make an estimate of the size of tax planning gain given the 
payments. 
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4 Tax parameters and tax planning results  
4.1 Tax parameters 
For lack of microdata on actual taxes paid we resort to the available tax rates at national 
level and those agreed in DTTs. 
In an extensive data collection effort, tax rates were obtained from the International Bureau 
of Fiscal Documentation (IBFD). This was done for three references years: 2008/2009, 2013 
and 2017/18. The most recent country information applies in most cases to the year 2017 
and/or 2018.17 The electronically available data from this source does not go further back 
than 2008. Data was collected for the set of 108 jurisdictions used in the network analysis of 
van ‘t Riet & Lejour (2018). These countries cover about 95% of world GDP and a substantial 
number of countries are classified as tax havens. 
We obtain six tax parameters by country and reference year. First, the headline CIT rate is 
either given by the IBFD, or decided by us. Next, for dividend, interest and royalties there are 
the default (standard) rates of the non-resident withholding tax.18 These rates may vary by 
sector, where we have selected the most general one. Finally, there are the unilateral double 
tax relief methods, which often differ for dividend and for interest and royalties. This gives 
two tax parameters by country and year indicating ‘deduction’, ‘credit’, or ‘exemption’ as 
discussed in section 3.19 
The bulk of the tax rates are bilateral; DTTs often agree on mutual lower tax rates than the 
default withholding tax rates for the three types of income flows. Reduced rates sometimes 
are conditional, again by sector or ownership. Without further information, and to keep 
computations manageable, we have applied the following heuristic to select one tax rate per 
country pair and income type. For dividends we take the lowest rate, because here the 
conditions often involve thresholds in ownership. We assume that companies meet these 
conditions and qualify for the lowest rate. For dividends, there are different rates for 
qualifying companies as opposed to individuals and companies in general. We have taken the 
former and apply these to the relevant flows. For interest we take the one but lowest rate, 
because the lowest rate often applies to special sectors.  
At the bilateral level the double tax relief methods could vary. For instance, Canada grants a 
participation exemption for dividend coming from treaty partners. Such detail we have not 
included. We have included the Parent-Subsidiary Directive and the Interest and Royalty 
Directive of the European Union (EU, 1990 and 2003). They imply zero withholding tax rates 
and dividend exemption on flows between EU member states in participation situations.  
 
As an introduction to these tax rates we present the world averages for the three reference 
years. The first three columns of Table 4.1 present the GDP-weighted world averages for the 
 
17 The IBFD Tax Research Platform was accessed online between end of January and March 2018. 
18 Note we use the dividend rate on substantial shares in ownership and not on portfolio dividend. 
19 The possibility of no-relief-at-all also exists. This has been treated as deduction. Some countries exempt only up to 95% 
of foreign source dividend. This has been treated as full exemption. 
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CIT rate and the three default withholding tax rates. We observe a very modest decline, and 
for interest not even monotonous. A tax race to the bottom cannot be observed in these 
world averages of nominal rates for this time period. We also observe that on average the 
variation between 2013 and 2017 is modest; the tax parameters of 2013 will be combined 
with the average flows over 2014-2016. The fourth column presents unweighted averages 
for 2013. These rates are much lower given the high weight of the US and its high tax rates; 
US in 2013, CIT is 39%, all three default withholding tax rates are 30%.  
 
Table 4.1 World average CIT and default withholding rates (in %) 
 2009 2013 2017 2013 
 Weighted Unweighted 
Corporate income tax 31.46 29.85 29.66 22.59 
Default withholding tax on dividend 20.60 19.72 19.64 12.75 
Default withholding tax on interest 19.57 17.84 18.39 12.49 
Default withholding tax on royalties 21.37 21.02 20.34 14.51 
 
In Table 4.2 world average withholding tax rates are considered based on the bilateral rates, 
included in the tax treaties. The first three columns present weighted averages, in this case 
double GDP-weighted. The level is obviously much lower than the defaults because of the 
mutually agreed reductions. No steady pattern is observed, an average increase from 2009 to 
2013, then a decline to 2017. The variation between 2013 and 2017 is again modest. The 
fourth column gives the unweighted averages for 2013. The level here is higher than that of 
the weighted averages, which implies that larger countries have larger reductions in the 
treaties compared to the default rates (confirmed by US bilateral rates).  
 
Table 4.2 World average bilateral withholding rates (in %) 
 2009 2013 2017 2013 
 Weighted Unweighted 
Bilateral withholding tax on dividend 7.23 7.99 7.69 10.69 
Bilateral withholding tax on interest 8.68 9.12 8.92 11.59 




4.2 Results on tax planning gain 
This section gives estimates on the direct tax planning gain and on the treaty shopping gain 
of the SPEs in our sample. We calculate the tax rates for the direct route and the indirect 
route for of each country pair, using the method described in section 3. These are then 
weighted by the bilateral flows, which are constructed by us in section 2.2. These weighted 
averages of the tax rates are reported in Table 4.3. For the direct tax planning gain we 
compare the weighted average tax rate on the direct route with the counterfactual where 
income would be taxed in the country of origin against the local CIT rate. For the treaty 
shopping gain we compare the weighted average tax rate for transferring income via an SPE 
in the Netherlands, with the counterfactual where the income would go directly from the 
country of origin to the country of destination. We only report the direct tax planning gain 
for interest and royalties, since for dividends the direct route is always more expensive than 
the CIT rate in the country of origin.  
 
Table 4.3 Weighted averages total (CIT and withholding) tax rates (in %) 
Weighted by 2008-2010, 
rates of 2009 
2012-2014, 
rates of 2013  
2014-2016, 
rates of 2013 
    
Flow of dividend (directly) 31.1 32.4 31.0 
Flow of dividend (via the Netherlands) 33.3 32.6 35.9 
  Treaty shopping gain (TSG) –2.2 –0.2 –4.9 
    
CIT in host country 27.6 24.6 23.9 
Flow of interest (directly) 29.8 26.3 26.1 
Flow of interest (via the Netherlands) 28.6 24.8 24.3 
  Direct tax planning gain (DTG)   –2.2 –1.7 –2.2 
  Treaty shopping gain (TSG) 1.2 1.5 1.7 
  Total tax planning gain (TPG) –1.0 –0.2 –0.5 
    
CIT in host country 15.4 15.0 15.1 
Flow of royalties (directly) 22.0 23.6 22.3 
Flow of royalties (via the Netherlands) 4.8 7.6 8.9 
  Direct tax planning gain (DTG)   –6.6 –8.6 –7.2 
  Treaty shopping gain (TSG) 17.2 16.0 13.4 
  Total tax planning gain (TPG) 10.6 7.4 6.2 
 
For dividend the treaty shopping gain is negative, which means that the total tax expenses 
increase when the Netherlands is included in the route. For interest and royalties, the treaty 
shopping gain is positive. This is especially the case for royalties, where the difference is 
13.4% points in 2014-2016. This is due to the lack of a withholding tax on royalties in the 
Netherlands and the low rates negotiated in tax treaties. For interest in 2014-2016 there is a 
treaty shopping gain of 1.7% points. Multiplied with the 3.1 billion euro from Table 2.7, this 
gives a treaty shopping gain of about 50 million euro. However, the total tax planning gain is 
negative (–0.5% points), because the total tax rate on the indirect route (24.3%) is higher 
than the local CIT rate in the host country (23.9%). As shown in Table 2.7, the SPEs in our 
sample transfer about 19.8 billion euro of royalties between two foreign countries, on 
average in 2014-2016. Since the average difference between the tax rate of direct and the 
indirect route was 13.4%, this implies a treaty shopping gain of about 2.65 billion euro. 
Compared to the situation where the flow stays in the host country and is taxed on average 
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at 15.1%, the total tax gain, composed of a direct planning loss and a treaty shopping gain, is 
6.2%. With a flow of 19.8 billion euro this implies a total tax gain on royalties of 1.2 billion 
euro. For dividends and interest we find total tax planning losses, with our method based on 
statutory tax rates. 
 
Our, admittedly rough, estimate of the total annual tax planning gain in 2014-2016, realized 
through the sample of Dutch SPEs, is therefore about 1.2 billion euro annually. Given a 
primary income flow of about hundred billion euro in that year, combined with an average 
CIT rate of about 30% and average withholding tax rates of around 20%, we conclude that 
we cannot derive massive tax planning gain using the Netherlands with our approximation. 
This does not imply that there are no substantial tax planning gains. For various reasons, 
discussed in section 3, these estimates are serious underestimations.  
 
With respect to interest, and possibly also for royalties, we expected larger differences 
between the CIT rates of the countries of origin and destination. These countries also include 
the US with a high CIT rate. It has been suggested that interest and royalties destined to the 
US may end up in states with preferential regimes, such as Delaware, and thus avoiding the 
high federal US rate. This would imply far higher tax planning gains for flows to the US.20 
However, we have no information on the particular states of destination in the US. As a 
sensitivity analysis we have excluded all country pairs where the US is the country of origin 
or destination. Since the US has a relatively high CIT rate, excluding the US leads to lower 
weighted average rates, see Table 4.4. The total tax planning gain changes sign from negative 
to positive for interest and becomes larger for royalties. These gains can still be interpreted 
as a conservative estimate because we have also exluded the US as country of origin. 
 
Table 4.4 Weighted averages total (CIT and withholding) tax rates (in %) 
Weighted by 2008-2010, 
rates of 2009 
2012-2014, 
rates of 2013  
2014-2016, 
rates of 2013 
    
Flow of dividend (directly) 29.9 30.6 27.2 
Flow of dividend (via the Netherlands) 30.3 27.6 27.3 
  Treaty shopping gain (TSG) –0.4 3.0 –0.1 
    
CIT in host country 26.3 23.6 23.2 
Flow of interest (directly) 26.1 23.4 23.2 
Flow of interest (via the Netherlands) 24.0 21.2 20.7 
  Direct tax planning gain (DTG)   0.2 0.2 0.0 
  Treaty shopping gain (TSG) 2.1 2.2 2.5 
  Total tax planning gain (TPG) 2.3 2.4 2.5 
    
CIT in host country 15.2 14.8 14.5 
Flow of royalties (directly) 20.3 21.4 18.7 
Flow of royalties (via the Netherlands) 1.3 3.1 2.0 
  Direct tax planning gain (DTG)   –5.1 –6.6 –4.2 
  Treaty shopping gain (TSG) 19.0 18.3 16.7 
  Total tax planning gain (TPG) 13.9 11.7 12.5 
 
 
20 In addition, there exists a well-known Dutch – American hybrid mismatch, the ‘CV/BV - structuur’, which amounts to no 
corporate taxation in the Netherlands, and no taxation in the US. See Vleggeert (2015), Leiden University Tax Blog (link). 
We do not have information for which flows to the US, in our data, this mismatch may apply. 
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5 The impact of tax differentials on primary 
income flows via Dutch SPEs 
There is hardly any research on the impact of taxation on bilateral primary income flows, 
like dividend, interest, and royalty income. The lack of data is a major reason of this, but still 
it is remarkable that the impact of bilateral taxation on these income flows is only indirectly 
examined by using bilateral investment flows or stocks.21 The availability of data on Dutch 
SPEs enables us to examine the tax motives of these income flows through Dutch SPEs.  
 
Our main variable of interest is the treaty shopping gain: the tax rate differential between the 
direct route from the host to the home country and the indirect route via the Netherlands. 
We calculate the tax burden that has to be paid on both routes, comprising of the relevant 
withholding taxes and corporate taxes, including double tax relief methods and CFC rules, as 
discussed in sections 3 and 4.2. This treaty shopping gain is also used by van ‘t Riet and 
Lejour (2018) in estimating the impact of treaty shopping on bilateral FDI stocks. We differ 
from Overesch and Wamser (2012) who construct a bilateral tax rate differential between 
the host and home country to examine whether this differential affects the size of interest 
flows and internal debt lending. Their tax rate differential is similar to our direct tax 
planning gain which is also included in the regressions.  
 
We explain the extensive and intensive margin of bilateral income flows in a gravity 
framework. The determinants of the likelihood that a route is used (extensive margin) are 
estimated using a probit model. For the determinants of the size of the flows (intensive 
margin), we use an OLS and a Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimator. The 
flows consist of dividend, interest or royalties between countries i and j, via the Netherlands. 
Country i is the host country of the foreign investment from which the primary income flow 
is repatriated. Country j is the residence of the multinational firm, receiving the primary 
income flow via the Netherlands. Although we have bilateral data by SPE cluster we do not 
use this dimension because we have hardly explanatory variables at the cluster level. 
Therefore we aggregate these flow data at the country-pair level. 
 
All variables in the regressions are three year averages between 2014 and 2016. We 
estimate thus a cross section. The data availability between the years 2004 and 2016 
suggests the application of panel regressions. This is, however, not possible. The size of the 
bilateral primary income flows varies widely over the years, while the time variation of the 
tax parameters is very limited, see also section 4.1. Therefore, we only exploit the variation 
of the flows between country pairs using a cross section of the most recent years. This also 
explains that we do not use country and year dummies.  
 
0 1 2 3 1 2 3 4ij i j ij i j ij ij ijFlow G G G TH TH DTG TSG                    (1) 
 
 
21 Examples are Blonigen and Davis, 2004, Egger et al, 2009, Sauvant and Sachs, 2009 and, Blonigen et al. 2014. 
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The vectors Gi and Gj refer to GDP in logarithms. The GDP data are from the World Bank 
Development Indicators, added with GDP data on tax havens from the CIA fact book. The 
vector Gij contains bilateral data from CEPII: distance, and dummies for a common language 
and for a former colonial relationship. Except for distance, we expect positive coefficients for 
these dummies. The subscripts refer to the home country, host country, a country pair. Note 
that we focus on the tax variables in this section and postpone the discussion of the 
estimated coefficients for the gravity variables to Appendix D. 
 
We add dummy variables for tax havens (TH), for which we expect a positive coefficient. 
These dummies are based on the Gravelle (2013) list. The variable DTGij is the direct tax 
planning gain. TSGij indicates the treaty shopping gain that can be achieved by using Dutch 
SPEs. Both variables have been discussed in section 4. The tax data come also from the 
sources mentioned in section 4. We only have tax parameters available for the years 2009, 
2013 and 2017. For the three year average between 2014 and 2016 we use the tax data from 
the year 2013. 
 
Table 5.1 Summary statistics for the variables in the regressions averaged 2014-2016 
 Variable 
 
Obs. Mean Standard 
deviation 
Min Max 
      
Tax haven (dummy) 106 0.255 0.436 0 1.000 
      
Dividend      
Ln(dividend in 1000 euro) 11130 0.514 2.027 0 14.12 
Pr(dividend>1000 euro) 11130 0.072 0.258 0 1.000 
Direct tax rate 11130 0.354 0.138 0 0.725 
Indirect tax rate 11130 0.413 0.161 0 0.904 
Treaty shopping gain 11130 -0.059 0.114 -0.500 0.276 
      
Interest      
Ln( interest in 1000 euro) 11130 0.639 1.696 0 12.59 
Pr(interest>1000 euro) 11130 0.190 0.392 0 1.000 
Direct tax rate 11130 0.259 0.101 0 0.649 
Indirect tax rate 11130 0.276 0.112 0 0.649 
Direct tax gain 11130 -0.033 0.131 -0.460 0.460 
Treaty shopping gain 11130 -0.017 0.071 -0.284 0.350 
      
Royalties      
Ln( royalties in 1000 euro) 11130 0.543 1.669 0 16.24 
Pr(Royalty>1000 euro) 11130 0.150 0.357 0 1.000 
Direct tax rate 11130 0.264 0.099 0 0.644 
Indirect tax rate 11130 0.278 0.113 0 0.640 
Direct tax gain 11130 -0.038 0.128 -0.460 0.460 
Treaty shopping gain 11130 -0.014 0.076 -0.264 0.333 
Notes: for the bilateral flows on dividend, interest and royalty, we apply a threshold of 1000 euro as also DNB is 
doing. For values below this threshold we replace the natural logarithms by 0.  Summary statistics of the gravity 
variables are presented in appendix D. 
 
Table 5.1 shows the summary statistics of the regression variables. The full set of data is 
available for 106 countries, which gives 106*105 = 11130 country pairs. The average 
differential between the repatriation tax rates on the direct and indirect route is negative for 
all three income flows, while in section 4.2 (Table 4.6), we find a positive treaty shopping 
gain for interest in the same period. In the latter case the differential is weighted by the size 
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of the actual interest flow, while the summary statistics in Table.5.1 are unweighted sample 
means. 
 
Equation (1) is estimated for the extensive margin and the intensive margin. For the 
extensive margin we use a probit regression in which the dependent variable indicates 
whether Dutch SPEs are used in between two countries. For selecting which routes are used 
we apply a 1000 euro threshold as also DNB applies. The value of the probit dummy is 1 if 
the allocated bilateral flow is at least 1000 euro and is 0 otherwise. The results of these 
probit regressions are presented in columns (1) and (2) in Tables 5.2 to 5.4. Column (1) 
presents the coefficients and column (2) the marginal effects.  
 
For many country pairs multinationals have not established a Dutch SPE for an indirect 
route.22 In these cases the size of the flow is zero, which is a well-known problem in 
estimating the intensive margin with gravity equations, because the natural logarithm of 
zero is undefined. In column (3) of Tables 5.2 to 5.4 we present the results for the OLS 
estimation of the intensive margin, using only flows that exceed 1000 euro. A different,  and 
standard, solution is to estimate a transformation of log (1+x), in which x is the value of the 
bilateral flow, which is applied for the OLS regressions in column (5) of Tables 5.2 to 5.4. 
This does not solve all problems. Because income values cannot be negative, the error 
distribution is truncated and could depend on the explanatory variables. Santos da Silva and 
Teynero (2006) use a Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) method for that reason. 
For robustness we present the results of the PPML estimator in column (4) of Tables 5.2 to 
5.4. A potential problem with PPML in our application is the extreme skewed distribution of 
some primary income flows in various years ranging from many zero values to values of 
more than 100 mln USD. This skewedness can be better captured with the transformed 
logarithm of the dependent variable in the OLS regressions presented in column (5). Table 
5.2 explains the extensive and intensive margin of dividend flows via the Netherlands. Table 
5.3 does the same for interest flows, and Table 5.4 for royalty flows.  
 
If one of the countries is a tax haven, the dividend flow is larger. This is in particular the case 
if the home country is a tax haven: the probability of a dividend flow is 11.6% points higher 
than without tax haven. The coefficient of about 2.8 in column (3) suggests that the bilateral 
dividend flow is about 1550% times higher if the home country is a tax haven.23 If the host 
country is a tax haven, the effect is much smaller, but still sizable.  
 
A higher treaty shopping gain has a positive impact on the probability and the size of the 
indirect dividend flow via the Netherlands, as is expected. The impact of a 10% point higher 
tax differential on the probability of a Dutch SPE is 1.6% points, which is substantial given 
the average probability of 7.2% (Table 5.1). The effect on the size of dividends in column (3) 
is positive, but insignificant. The coefficient of 0.25 in column (3) suggests that the bilateral 
 
22 It is possible that there are SPEs which would have a bilateral flow for a country pair but which do not have the incoming 
and outgoing flows in the same period; we ignore them in the analysis and put the dummy variable, for the country pair, at 
zero.   
23 For all numbers in the text based on column (3) we take the exponent of the coefficient and subtract 1. Due to the large 
coefficients in many cases, the outcomes differ substantially from interpreting the coefficients as semi-elasticities. That 
interpretation is only valid for small coefficients.  
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dividend flow via the Netherlands is hardly 3% higher if the difference between the direct 
and indirect tax rate is 10% points higher. 
 
Table 5.2 Explaining bilateral dividend flows using tax variables for 2014 to 2016 
Bilateral dividend flows  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Estimation method Probit probit ols>0 ppml ols 
            
Tax haven host country 0.252*** 0.0252*** 1.208*** 1.409*** 0.260*** 
   (0.0627) (0.00626) (0.313) (0.330) (0.0486) 
Tax haven home country 1.160*** 0.116*** 2.803*** 2.242*** 0.962*** 
   (0.0616) (0.00607) (0.331) (0.320) (0.0567) 
Treaty shopping gain (bilateral) 1.574*** 0.158*** 0.248 2.141** 1.021*** 
 (0.184) (0.0185) (0.909) (0.891) (0.164) 
Constant -16.12*** 
 
-22.73*** -32.53*** -10.83*** 
 (0.576) 
 
(2.858) (3.576) (0.547) 
 
     Observations 11,130 11,130 796 11,130 11,130 
R-squared 0.287 
 
0.172 0.087 0.143 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Columns (1) and (2) present the results of the 
probit regressions with the estimated coefficients and marginal effects, respectively. The dependent variable is 1 if there is a Dutch 
SPE and 0 otherwise. Column (3) presents the results for the OLS regression with positive income flows as dependent (intensive 
margin). Columns (4) and (5) present the results for the PPML and OLS regression on zero and positive income flows. The 
estimated coefficients of the gravity variables are presented in appendix D. 
 
We did not find substantial tax savings for dividends with our method using statutory tax 
rates in Section 4. The weighted average total tax expense is actually higher for the indirect 
route via the Netherlands than for the direct route. When we control for other (bilateral) 
country characteristics in a regression analysis, we do find that tax parameters are relevant 
for explaining the dividend flows via Dutch SPEs. A higher bilateral tax rate differential 
increases both the probability that the Dutch SPE is used and the size of the dividend flow.  
 
Table 5.3 presents the results of the same set of regressions for bilateral interest flows via 
the Netherlands. As with dividend flows, a tax haven as home country has a larger impact on 
the probability of a Dutch SPE and on the size of the primary income flow than a tax haven as 
host country. The direct tax gain has an insignificant coefficient. This is not obvious; a higher 
CIT rate in the host country could stimulate larger outgoing interest flows to lower profits 
taxation in the home country, but also the negative effect on investment could dominate.  
 
We expect that a higher tax treaty shopping gain has a positive impact on interest flows via 
the Netherlands. This is indeed the case for the probability of a flow. The coefficient suggests 
that a 10% point higher tax differential increases the probability of a Dutch SPE by 1.6%. It 
increases the size of the interest flow by 31% according to the coefficient in column (3). The 
results in this table show that a larger tax rate differential between the direct and indirect 
route stimulates the establishments of SPEs in the Netherlands for interest flows and also 




Table 5.3 Explaining bilateral interest flows using tax variables for 2014 to 2016 
Bilateral Interest flow (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Estimation method Probit probit ols>0 ppml ols 
            
Tax haven host country 0.675*** 0.134*** 1.274*** 1.408*** 0.629*** 
   (0.0460) (0.00890) (0.144) (0.429) (0.0403) 
Tax haven home country 1.160*** 0.231*** 1.763*** 1.757*** 1.005*** 
   (0.0460) (0.00840) (0.139) (0.262) (0.0434) 
Direct tax gain (bilateral) -0.0138 -0.00275 -0.181 0.559 0.0434 
 
(0.137) (0.0273) (0.499) (1.668) (0.110) 
Treaty shopping gain (bilateral) 0.813*** 0.162*** 2.707*** 7.146*** 0.799*** 
 
(0.237) (0.0470) (0.786) (1.613) (0.233) 
Constant -18.03***  -13.83*** -27.16*** -12.74*** 
 
(0.437)  (1.297) (4.239) (0.401) 
 
     
Observations 11,130 11,130 2,109 11,130 11,130 
R-squared   0.176 0.030 0.216 
 11,130 11,130 2,109 11,130 11,130 
 0.269  0.177 0.031 0.218 
Notes: see notes Table 5.2.  
 
We present the regression results for bilateral royalties via the Netherlands in Table 5.4. The 
empirical literature on bilateral royalty flows is scarce. Besides a recent paper of Dudar et al. 
(2015) on the impact of taxation on bilateral royalty flows, we are not aware of other papers. 
 
The coefficient of being a tax haven in the host and home country is statistically significant. 
The direct tax gain has a positive impact on the possible existence of the indirect royalty 
flow, but we do not find a robust effect on the size. A higher treaty shopping gain has a 
positive impact on the probability of an indirect flow. A 10%-point higher treaty shopping 
gain raises the probability by 3.4% points. The results of column (3) suggests that a 10%-
point higher treaty shopping gain increases the size of the indirect flow by 76%, much more 
than for dividend and interest flows. For a 1%-point this corresponds to an increase of the 
size of the indirect flow by 5.8%. With respect to the magnitude this is comparable to Dudar 
et al. (2015). Using a PPML-estimator they find that a 1% point higher tax rate differential 
between the host and home country lowers the direct royalty flow with about 6%, which is 
consistent with the effect we find for the intensive margin. However, using a PPML estimator 
we find a much larger effect of 27%. 
 
The coefficients are larger than for interest and dividend flows. Given the intangible nature 
of royalties this ordering seems not to be surprising. There is hardly empirical literature for 




Table 5.4 Explaining bilateral royalty flows using tax variables for 2014 to 2016 
Bilateral royalty flows (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Estimation method Probit Probit ols>0 ppml ols 
            
Tax haven host country 0.316*** 0.0481*** 1.719*** 6.546*** 0.435*** 
   (0.0544) (0.00824) (0.240) (1.416) (0.0396) 
Tax haven home country 0.986*** 0.150*** 1.463*** 2.761*** 0.685*** 
   (0.0530) (0.00763) (0.182) (0.696) (0.0382) 
Direct tax gain (bilateral) 1.902*** 0.290*** -0.204 0.407 0.858*** 
 (0.174) (0.0261) (0.755) (3.419) (0.108) 
Treaty shopping gain (bilateral) 2.211*** 0.337*** 5.655*** 26.93*** 1.110*** 
 (0.258) (0.0390) (1.214) (6.169) (0.232) 
Constant -22.62*** 
 
-17.04*** -52.67*** -13.08*** 
 (0.545) 
 
(2.026) (10.99) (0.440) 
 
     Observations 11,130 11,130 1,669 11,130 11,130 
R-squared 0.352 
 
0.118 0.186 0.186 





There are a number of countries in the world which either invest or receive much more 
direct foreign investment than could be expected based on their economic size. In many 
cases these countries are tax havens in which assets and other wealth can be parked and 
sometimes hidden, at nearly no tax costs. In other cases these countries are conduits, such as 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Except for a number of publications on tax leaks, there is 
hardly any systematic information available at the firm level of these income flows.  
 
An exception is the financial data of the most important Dutch SPEs, which we exploit in this 
paper. These data are available at the country level between 2004 and 2016. This paper 
describes the size of the flows and the geographical pattern. Moreover, it establishes the 
relationship between tax parameters and the size of income flows via the Netherlands. These 
SPEs are responsible for about 10% to 12% of the global FDI stock. The macro data show a 
large increase in FDI and loans in these years, from 1500 to 4200 billion euro. The most 
important flows are dividends. The size of outgoing dividends is 51 billion euro and 
incoming 77 billion euro annually in 2014-2016. A part of the incoming dividends are used 
for new loans and investments. The incoming and outgoing royalty flows are 26 and 28 
billion euro on average in 2014-2016.  
 
Bermuda is the most important destination for royalty and interest flows. The flows come 
from Ireland, Singapore and the United States. For interest flows, the geographical 
distribution is somewhat broader. About half of the dividends goes to multinationals in the 
US, UK or Switzerland. Other destinations are other European countries and some tax 
havens. The source of dividend is really multilateral: from Europa, North and South America, 
Asia and Oceania. Also for these flows various tax havens are involved as recipient or sender 
of these flows. This suggests that the diversion of income flows does not involve only one 
country but several ones, see also Hong (2018) and Van ‘t Riet and Lejour (2018). 
 
We find a substantial tax reduction for royalties by using Dutch SPEs. The total tax expense, 
including withholding taxes, is on average lower for the indirect route compared to the direct 
route. The total tax expense using the indirect route is also lower than the corporate income 
tax rate in the host country. However, with our method using statutory tax rates, we cannot 
find substantial tax savings for dividends and interest. For dividends, the weighted average 
total tax expense is actually higher for the indirect route via the Netherlands than for the 
direct route.  
 
When we control for other (bilateral) country characteristics in a regression analysis, we do 
find that for all three income types, tax parameters are relevant for explaining the 
geographical pattern of flows via Dutch SPEs. A treaty shopping gain  increases the 
probability that the indirect route via the Netherlands is used. An increase in the tax 
differential of the direct route and the indirect route also increases the expected size of the 
flow via Dutch SPEs. 
 
28 
From a policy perspective, it would be  interesting to repeat this analysis within a few years 
when the anti-tax-avoidance policy measures are implemented. Examples are the European 
ATAD1 and 2 directives, action 6 of the BEPS report on the abuse of treaty shopping and the 
conditional withholding taxes on royalty and interest flows in the Netherlands.  All these 
measures could change the landscape of tax avoidance and SPEs. The possible impact of 
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Appendix A: Assets and liabilities 
Table A.1 Categories of assets and liabilities 
Assets Liabilities 
  
Affiliates Equity (major shareholders) 
Affiliates >= 10% Major shareholders >= 10% 
Affiliates < 10% Major shareholders < 10% 
Affiliates in mother Major shareholders (daughter) 
  
Debt (including bonds) Debt 
Other loans Other loans 
Listed bonds  
  
Other assets Other liabilities (including bonds) 
Listed shares Listed shares 
Derivatives Derivatives 
Real estate Listed bonds 
Firm resources  
Goodwill  
Licenses and permits  




Table A.2 Categories of incoming and outgoing flows 
Incoming Outgoing 
  
Dividends from affiliates Dividends to affiliates 
From affiliates >= 10% To major shareholders >= 10% 
From affiliates < 10% To major shareholders < 10% 
From affiliates in mother To major shareholders (daughter) 
  
Interest from other loans Interest on other loans 
Other loans Interest on other loans 
  
Royalties Royalties 
Incoming royalties  Outgoing royalties 
  
Other income Other costs 
Dividends from listed shares Dividends on listed shares 
Interest from listed bonds Interest on listed bonds 
Other income Other costs 




Appendix B: Alternative allocation 
Section 2.2 explains the allocation of bilateral flows. That allocation is based on the minimum 
of total incoming and total outgoing income of a cluster of SPEs. As an alternative, we base 









where Fio,xy is the calculated flow of type i from country x to country y as type o, It=i,x is the 
incoming flow of type i from country x, Ot=o,y is the outgoing flow of type o to country y, TI is 
the total incoming flow of the cluster from all countries and in all types and TO is the total 
outgoing flow of the cluster to all countries and in all types. Subscripts for time and clusters 
are omitted. The left part of the equation gives a fraction of the total flow of the cluster that 
we allocate to the flow between country x and y as type i to type o. We only take into account 
positive incoming and outgoing flows and we ignore negative flows. After calculating the 
bilateral primary income flows, we determine the aggregates between two countries by 
summing over all clusters. Table B.1 shows the assigned primary income flows, by type 
averaged over 2014-2016.  
 
Table B.1 Alternative assigned primary income flows, by type in 2014-2016 (x billion euros) 
          To: Dividend Interest Royalties Other To NL /  
retained 
Total 
From:       
Dividend 53.8 11.7 11.0 12.0 -11.4 76.9 
Interest 10.5 5.6 1.7 10.4 -5.1 23.1 
Royalties 3.0 0.4 22.4 0.6 -0.5 25.9 
Other 1.3 0.4 0.3 1.4 -1.1 2.3 
From NL / 
retained 















Appendix C: Tax havens 
Table C.1   Tax haven list  
Country CIT rate( %) Country CIT rate (%) 
    
Andorra  Liechtenstein 12.5 
Anguilla  Luxembourg 27.8 
Antigua and Barbuda  Macao 12 
Aruba 25 Maldives  
Bahamas 0 Malta 35 
Bahrain 46 Marshall Islands  
Barbados 25 Mauritius 15 
Belize  Monaco  
Bermuda 0 Montserrat  
British Virgin islands 0 Naura  
Cayman Islands 0 Netherlands Antilles  
Cook Islands  Niue  
Costa Rica 30 Panama 25 
Cyprus 12.5 Saint Kitts and Nevis  
Dominca  Saint Lucia  
Gibraltar  Samoa  
Grenada  San Marino  
Guernsey 0 Seychelles 30 
Hong Kong 16.6 Singapore 17 
Ireland 12.5 St Vincent and the Grenadines 
Isle of Man 0 Switzerland 21.1 
Jersey 0 Tonga  
Jordan 20 Turks and Caicos Islands 
Libanon 15 Vanuatu  
Liberia  Virgin Islands US 38.5 
 
 
The table gives the Gravelle (2013) list of 50 tax havens. The intersection with our selection 
of 108 jurisdictions is marked by the CIT rates in the table. This gives 26 countries. Some 
countries are in our selection but are not on the Gravelle list. Two examples are the United 
Arab Emirates (0%) and Puerto Rico (20%). Observe that we have taken a single, headline 
nominal CIT rate for each country.  
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Appendix D: coefficients estimates of the gravity 
variables 
Table D.1 Summary statistics for the gravity variables in the regressions averaged 2014-2016 
Gravity variables Obs. Mean Standard 
deviation 
Min Max 
      
Ln(GDP in euro) 106 25.27 2.05 20.59 30.42 
Ln(distance in km) 11130 8.626 0.896 1.54 9.89 
Common language (dummy) 11130 0.136 0.343 0 1 
Colony (dummy) 11130 0.017 0.128 0 1 
 
The gravity variables have a similar role as in other studies. A larger economy of the host and 
home country of investment increases the probability of a primary income flow via a Dutch 
SPE and also larger flows. Distance between these two countries has a negative effect on the 
probability of the flow and its size. A common language increases the possibility of a SPE in 
the Netherlands, but is not statistically significant. A former colonial relation between both 
countries has a significant positive effect on the probability of a flow and also  on the size of 
the flow.  
 
Table D.2 Explaining bilateral dividend flows using tax variables for 2014 to 2016 (gravity part) 
Bilateral dividend flows  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Estimation method Probit probit ols>0 ppml ols 
            
Ln(GDP) host country 0.222*** 0.0223*** 0.455*** 0.542*** 0.171*** 
   (0.0132) (0.00132) (0.0680) (0.0802) (0.0111) 
Ln(GDP) home country 0.420*** 0.0420*** 0.753*** 1.081*** 0.356*** 
   (0.0144) (0.00147) (0.0692) (0.0949) (0.0149) 
Ln(distance) -0.275*** -0.0275*** -0.428*** -0.450*** -0.261*** 
 
(0.0219) (0.00219) (0.0932) (0.119) (0.0260) 
Common language dummy 0.0630 0.00631 -0.114 0.491 0.0554 
 
(0.0645) (0.00646) (0.337) (0.353) (0.0575) 
Former colony dummy 0.433*** 0.0434*** 0.705 0.476 1.019*** 
 (0.115) (0.0115) (0.460) (0.337) (0.272) 




Table D.3 presents the results of the same set of regressions for bilateral interest flows via 
the Netherlands. The coefficient for a common language is positive and statistically 
significant in the probit and OLS regressions. 
 
Table D.3 Explaining bilateral interest flows using tax variables for 2014 to 2016 (gravity part) 
Bilateral interest flow (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Estimation method probit probit ols>0 ppml ols 
            
Ln(GDP) host country 0.345*** 0.0686*** 0.351*** 0.584*** 0.278*** 
   (0.0105) (0.00183) (0.0329) (0.0694) (0.00943) 
Ln(GDP) home country 0.364*** 0.0724*** 0.428*** 0.754*** 0.310*** 
   (0.0106) (0.00182) (0.0331) (0.154) (0.0103) 
Ln(distance) -0.180*** -0.0358*** -0.502*** -0.416** -0.225*** 
 
(0.0172) (0.00337) (0.0495) (0.168) (0.0202) 
Common language dummy 0.101** 0.0201** 0.399*** 0.559 0.167*** 
 
(0.0474) (0.00942) (0.137) (0.515) (0.0480) 
Former colony dummy 0.506*** 0.101*** 0.793*** 0.321 1.059*** 
 (0.104) (0.0206) (0.261) (0.404) (0.200) 





Table D.4 Explaining bilateral royalty flows using tax variables for 2014 to 2016 (gravity part) 
Bilateral royalty flows (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Estimation method Probit probit ols>0 ppml ols 
            
Ln(GDP) host country 0.380*** 0.0580*** 0.436*** 1.117*** 0.263*** 
   (0.0122) (0.00162) (0.0481) (0.231) (0.0102) 
Ln(GDP) home country 0.487*** 0.0742*** 0.333*** 0.746*** 0.295*** 
   (0.0133) (0.00167) (0.0517) (0.179) (0.0103) 
Ln(distance) -0.129*** -0.0196*** -0.0688 0.342 -0.0841*** 
 (0.0197) (0.00300) (0.0598) (0.290) (0.0183) 
Common language dummy -0.101* -0.0154* 0.683*** 3.593*** 0.0907* 
 (0.0591) (0.00901) (0.242) (0.479) (0.0482) 
Former colony dummy 0.195* 0.0297* 0.507 -1.094* 0.490*** 
 (0.113) (0.0173) (0.358) (0.563) (0.184) 





Appendix E: Pooled regressions for bilateral flows 
Table E.1 Explaining bilateral dividend flows using tax variables for 2005 to 2016 
Bilateral Interest flow (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Estimation method Probit Prob ols>0 ppml Ols 
            
Ln(GDP) host country 0.245*** 0.0230*** 0.417*** 0.569*** 0.179*** 
   (0.00690) (0.000648) (0.0360) (0.0469) (0.00566) 
Ln(GDP) home country 0.446*** 0.0419*** 0.630*** 0.942*** 0.345*** 
   (0.00763) (0.000725) (0.0387) (0.0452) (0.00718) 
Ln(distance) -0.279*** -0.0262*** -0.572*** -0.523*** -0.271*** 
 (0.0113) (0.00106) (0.0487) (0.0646) (0.0132) 
Common language dummy -0.0305 -0.00287 0.0995 0.720*** 0.0334 
 (0.0348) (0.00327) (0.184) (0.213) (0.0274) 
Former colony dummy 0.472*** 0.0445*** 1.063*** 0.876*** 1.125*** 
 (0.0581) (0.00546) (0.245) (0.258) (0.142) 
Tax haven host country 0.277*** 0.0261*** 1.257*** 1.400*** 0.284*** 
   (0.0331) (0.00311) (0.166) (0.237) (0.0241) 
Tax haven home country 1.168*** 0.110*** 2.252*** 1.841*** 0.884*** 
   (0.0328) (0.00304) (0.184) (0.157) (0.0266) 
Treaty shopping gain (bilateral) 1.147*** 0.108*** -0.499 3.060*** 0.704*** 
 (0.0915) (0.00864) (0.429) (0.506) (0.0820) 
Year dummy 2008-2010 0.147*** 0.0139*** 0.168 0.407* 0.0706*** 
 (0.0328) (0.00308) (0.162) (0.210) (0.0235) 
Year dummy 2011-2013 -0.0621* -0.00584* 0.739*** 0.129 -0.0579** 
 (0.0327) (0.00308) (0.156) (0.224) (0.0245) 
Year dummy 2014-2016 -0.159*** -0.0150*** 0.0184 -0.436** -0.155*** 
 (0.0330) (0.00311) (0.159) (0.214) (0.0239) 
Constant -17.21***  -17.15*** -28.33*** -10.52*** 
 (0.303)  (1.528) (1.704) (0.262) 
      
Observations 44,520 44,520 3,024 44,520 44,520 
R-squared 0.307  0.158 0.069 0.144 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Columns (1) and (2) present the results of the 
probit regressions with the estimated coefficients and marginal effects, respectively. The dependent variable is 1 if there is a Dutch 
SPE and 0 otherwise. Column (3) presents the results for the OLS regression with positive income flows as dependent (intensive 
margin). Columns (4) and (5) present the results for the PPML and OLS regression on zero and positive income flows.  The data 




Table E.2 Explaining bilateral interest flows using tax variables for 2005 to 2016 
Bilateral dividend flows  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Estimation method prob prob Ols>0 ppml ols 
            
Ln(GDP) host country 0.359*** 0.0722*** 0.409*** 0.687*** 0.311*** 
   (0.00533) (0.000925) (0.0174) (0.0397) (0.00504) 
Ln(GDP) home country 0.369*** 0.0742*** 0.529*** 0.844*** 0.342*** 
   (0.00535) (0.000921) (0.0166) (0.0581) (0.00544) 
Ln(distance) -0.258*** -0.0520*** -0.618*** -0.661*** -0.327*** 
 (0.00849) (0.00167) (0.0238) (0.0708) (0.0110) 
Common language dummy -0.0449* -0.00903* 0.480*** 0.106 0.0860*** 
 (0.0247) (0.00497) (0.0783) (0.199) (0.0245) 
Former colony dummy 0.401*** 0.0807*** 0.884*** 1.081*** 1.069*** 
 (0.0521) (0.0105) (0.136) (0.220) (0.108) 
Tax haven host country 0.586*** 0.118*** 0.936*** 0.898*** 0.562*** 
   (0.0234) (0.00462) (0.0740) (0.189) (0.0204) 
Tax haven home country 1.093*** 0.220*** 2.069*** 2.250*** 1.051*** 
   (0.0232) (0.00433) (0.0679) (0.136) (0.0229) 
Direct tax gain (bilateral) 0.250*** 0.0503*** -0.430* -1.114 0.163*** 
 (0.0681) (0.0137) (0.248) (0.699) (0.0566) 
Treaty shopping gain (bilateral) 1.552*** 0.313*** 4.159*** 7.280*** 1.511*** 
 (0.121) (0.0242) (0.409) (0.849) (0.124) 
Year dummy 2008-2010 0.0299 0.00602 0.264*** 0.229 0.0596*** 
 (0.0223) (0.00450) (0.0638) (0.215) (0.0213) 
Year dummy 2011-2013 -0.302*** -0.0607*** -0.137** -0.471** -0.245*** 
 (0.0228) (0.00457) (0.0675) (0.208) (0.0213) 
Year dummy 2014-2016 -0.410*** -0.0825*** -0.519*** -0.908*** -0.390*** 
 (0.0231) (0.00461) (0.0676) (0.253) (0.0209) 
Constant -17.34***  -16.57*** -29.55*** -13.07*** 
 (0.215)  (0.646) (1.793) (0.211) 
      
Observations 44,520 44,520 8,921 44,520 44,520 
R-squared 0.281  0.230 0.118 0.245 




Table E.3 Explaining bilateral royalty flows using tax variables for 2005 to 2016 
Bilateral royalty flows (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Estimation method Prob prob Ols>0 ppml ols 
            
Ln(GDP) host country 0.397*** 0.0710*** 0.383*** 1.093*** 0.258*** 
   (0.00572) (0.000858) (0.0178) (0.140) (0.00447) 
Ln(GDP) home country 0.470*** 0.0840*** 0.328*** 0.763*** 0.289*** 
   (0.00603) (0.000861) (0.0192) (0.109) (0.00478) 
Ln(distance) -0.109*** -0.0195*** -0.0934*** 0.253* -0.0779*** 
 (0.00927) (0.00165) (0.0232) (0.140) (0.00819) 
Common language dummy -0.0746*** -0.0134*** 0.684*** 3.393*** 0.110*** 
 (0.0275) (0.00492) (0.100) (0.322) (0.0225) 
Former colony dummy 0.164*** 0.0293*** 0.300** -0.379 0.411*** 
 (0.0549) (0.00981) (0.145) (0.338) (0.0846) 
Tax haven host country 0.371*** 0.0663*** 0.797*** 6.212*** 0.387*** 
   (0.0252) (0.00448) (0.0826) (0.858) (0.0183) 
Tax haven home country 0.749*** 0.134*** 1.768*** 3.083*** 0.654*** 
   (0.0249) (0.00431) (0.0771) (0.407) (0.0181) 
Direct tax gain (bilateral) 1.106*** 0.198*** -0.684** -0.895 0.495*** 
 (0.0779) (0.0138) (0.273) (1.809) (0.0482) 
Treaty shopping gain (bilateral) 1.882*** 0.337*** 5.536*** 27.57*** 1.273*** 
 (0.124) (0.0219) (0.471) (3.735) (0.116) 
Year dummy 2008-2010 -0.422*** -0.0755*** -0.181*** 1.235* -0.202*** 
 (0.0239) (0.00424) (0.0589) (0.750) (0.0165) 
Year dummy 2011-2013 -0.420*** -0.0751*** 0.0797 1.419* -0.182*** 
 (0.0231) (0.00410) (0.0593) (0.774) (0.0186) 
Year dummy 2014-2016 -0.911*** -0.163*** 0.510*** 1.387** -0.331*** 
 (0.0253) (0.00434) (0.0764) (0.654) (0.0187) 
Constant -21.82***  -15.71*** -53.02*** -12.52*** 
 (0.247)  (0.729) (6.867) (0.193) 
      
Observations 44,520 44,520 8,562 44,520 44,520 
R-squared 0.351  0.177 0.193 0.211 
Notes: see notes Table E.1. 
 
 
